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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE ISSUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION CONFLICTS WITH THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND WITH UTAH CODE ANN. 55 78-12-8, ET SEP., AND
APPLICABLE LAW.
A.

Defendant's Position Is Consistent With The Statutory And Common Law Basis For Extinguishment Of An
Easement-By-Necessity Through Adverse Possession.

Plaintiff contends that an easement-by-necessity, unlike other
easements, cannot be extinguished by adverse possession because of
public policy reasons and because easements-by-necessity are only
extinguished when the necessity ceases or the easement holder relinquishes the easement.

(Brief of Appellee, at 6-9.)

Plaintiff

further states that no authority exists "for the proposition that
adverse possession can extinguish an easement-by-necessity."

(Id.)

In taking that position, plaintiff ignores Utah statutory law and
the case law of other jurisdictions which recognize that an easement-by-necessity can be lost through adverse possession.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1953), for example, is all encompassing and permits extinguishment
through adverse possession.

of all property interests

It provides:

Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under
whom he claims, entered into possession of the property
under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding
such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of the property in question, . . . and that there
has been a continued occupation and possession of the
property included in such instrument . . . for seven years,
the property so included is deemed to have been held
adversely. . . . [Emphasis added.]

This statute reflects a legislative policy to ensure that a purchaser of real property who satisfies the statutory requirements
of adverse possession for seven years is entitled to rely on the
record title and that all competing rights to that property are
extinguished.

It prevents a long-standing, non-used easement from

encumbering title and disrupting beneficial current use.

Through

the statute the legislature provided a means of protecting and preserving property rights and interests when the adverse possession
procedures prescribed by the legislature are followed. That policy
is implemented and made clear by use of the phrase, "whenever it
appears that the occupant."

Use of the term "whenever" evidences

a plain legislative intent to extinguish any competing property
claims, whether they are based on another written instrument or
a claimed easement-by-necessity, if the statutory procedures are
met.

Plaintiff ignores this express statutory language and cites

case law from other jurisdictions that does not deal with broad
statutory language like that adopted by our legislature in Sections 78-12-8, at seq.
Also, contrary to plaintiff's contention that no authority
exists

to

support

extinguishment

of

an

easement-by-necessity

through adverse possession, plaintiff's position in this case is
consistent with the case law from other jurisdictions.

That law

recognizes the right of an owner of a servient estate to extinguish
an easement-by-necessity based on adverse possession.

In Pencader

Assoc, Inc. v. Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097 (Dela. 1982), for

example, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the law relating to
easements-by-necessity, including the circumstances in which such
easements may be lost.

Id. at 1099-1100.

The court stated that

easements-by-necessity may be abandoned and may also be extinguished by adverse possession, despite the general proposition
that "a right to a way-of-necessity exists so long as the necessity
from which it arose exists." Id. at 1100. According to the court,
11

[a] dverse possession by the owner of the servient estate can be

found, provided all of the elements of adverse possession are established."

Id.

Thus, applicable statutory and case law support

defendant's position that an easement-by-necessity may be lost
through adverse possession,1 especially as in this case where there
is nothing in the county records showing any claim of easement that
would alert the landowner that such a claim exists.
B.

The Seven-Year Statutory Period Applies To Adverse
Possession Of An Easement-By-Necessity.

Assuming an easement-by-necessity may be adversely possessed,
plaintiff next advocates use of the 20-year common law prescriptive easement period for purposes of showing adverse possession.
(Brief of Appellee, at 10-14.)

As he did before the trial court,

plaintiff erroneously contends that cases from other jurisdictions
show that the common law period of prescription applies, rather

1

The trial court in the present case recognized that an easement-by-necessity may be lost by adverse possession, but did not
base its decision on Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, et seg. See Order
attached as part of the Addendum to Brief of Appellant, at 5-6.

than the seven-year period expressly prescribed by Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-12-8 and 78-12-12 (1953).
tiff is mistaken.

Plaintiff's own cases show plain-

First, in Beebe v. Swerda, 793 P.2d 442 (Wash.

Ct. App. 1990), the court did not hold that the common law period
for

acquiring

suggests.

a

prescriptive

easement

applies,

as plaintiff

The court merely held that "[w]hile it is legally

possible for an easement to be terminated by adverse use for the
prescriptive period. . . , the elements required to do so are the
same elements that must be found in order to obtain an easement
through adverse possession."

JEd. at 446 (citations omitted).

As

to the "elements" required to be shown, the Court stated in the
next sentence:
To establish prescriptive rights by adverse possession,
the claimant must show use which was open, notorious,
continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse to the owner for
the statutory period.
Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added).

Thus, the "elements" are open,

notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse use, and it is
the "statutory period" that governs.
Second, in Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1994), the
court did not hold that an easement may be extinguished by adverse
possession pursuant to the common law "prescriptive period" of
the state rather than the statutory period, as plaintiff states.
(Brief of Appellee, at 11.) When the Court in Mueller referred to
the "prescriptive period," that reference was to the "statutory
period."

See id. at 509.

According to the court, "the ten year

prescriptive period" is found in Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-103.

Id.

Additionally, plaintiff's arguments in the present case again
ignore the express statutory language of Utah's adverse possession
statute stating the period of time required to show adverse possession. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 states that when "there has been a
continued occupation and possession of the property included in
such instrument . . . for seven years, the property so included is
deemed to have been held adversely. ..."

There can be no mistake

that the legislature provided for a seven-year prescriptive period
under Utah's adverse possession law "[w]henever it appears that the
occupant . . . entered into possession of the property under claim of
title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a written
instrument as being a conveyance of the property in question. . . ."
See id. That seven-year period applies to appellant's claim of adverse possession in the present case.
The Utah Territorial case of Harkness v. Woodmansee, 26 P. 291
(Terr. Utah 1891), does not change that fact. As demonstrated in
defendant's initial brief, Harkness merely stands for the proposition that a party claiming a prescriptive easement cannot obtain
such an easement under the statutory seven-year period for adverse
possession.

2

See Harkness, 26 P. at 293.

The Harkness Court's

This Court will also note that in both Beebe and Mueller,
the courts stated that an easement may be terminated through adverse possession. Beebe, 793 P.2d at 446; Mueller, 887 P.2d at 509
("An easement for a private road which has been 'definitively and
functionally in existence' may be terminated by adverse possession
when access is obstructed for the prescriptive period").

statement that the adverse possession statute "does not apply to
rights of way or any other class of easement by prescription" can
only be read in this way.3

Plaintiff cannot contest the fact that

the Court's statement was made in the context of its resolution of
the issue of whether a party claiming a prescriptive easement could
do so within the seven-year statutory period for adverse possession, rather than the 20-year common law period for a prescriptive
easement.

See id. at 292-93.

According to the Court in Harkness, the statute "does not
. . . give the person relying upon it the title from seven years'
possession alone; the presumption is made from the fact that the
land was held adversely; and to make the holding adverse the land
must have been protected by a substantial inclosure, or it must
have been usually cultivated or improved, " and claimant "must have
paid all taxes levied and assessed on the land according to law."
Id. at 293.

The plaintiff's claimed use in Harkness, for which a

prescriptive easement was claimed, involved none of these statutory
elements.

Thus, when the Court stated in the next sentence that

the "statute does not apply to rights of way or any other class of
easement by prescription," the reasons for the statement are clear.
Parties claiming easements, whether prescriptive or otherwise, do
not "hold" land adversely, do not "protect" the land by a substan-

3

Defendant in the present case does not seek a right of way
or easement by prescription. Accordingly, Harkness, in any event,
is inapposite.

tial inclosure, do not usually cultivate or improve it, and do
not pay taxes on the land.

The fee owner of property, under the

statutory procedure, is the only one who has the right to assert
an adverse possession claim if those statutory conditions are satisfied.

Plaintiff's and the trial court's reliance on Harkness,

based on an isolated statement taken out of context, therefore,
misses the issue raised in Harkness. It also ignores the statutory
language of Section 78-12-8, which provides for title by adverse
possession after "seven years."4
Plaintiff's argument that the 20-year common law prescriptive
period should apply in the present case because plaintiff is the
"interloper using appellant's land for ingress and egress" is
similarly unavailing.

(See Brief of Appellee, at 14.)

Plaintiff

relies on Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148
(Utah 1946), to suggest that cases founded on adverse possession
require "complete and exclusive exercise of dominion by the claimant, or interloper."

(Brief of Appellee, at 13-14.) If, as plain-

tiff contends, defendant took her property subject to the claimed
easement-by-necessity that existed back to 1902

4

(see Brief of

Even plaintiff acknowledges that the "doctrine of adverse
possession relates to the acquisition of the basic fee title to a
piece of property," while "prescriptive easements and easements by
necessity, although different, relate to the use of another's title
rather than obtaining fee title."
(Brief of Appellee, at 13.)
Thus, consistent with Harkness, a party claiming a prescriptive
easement cannot obtain that easement in seven years under the adverse possession statute, whereas a party claiming title through
adverse possession can extinguish competing claims after seven
years.

Appellee, at 3), then defendant is the interloper or claimant.
Plaintiff's argument based on Moyle is simply incorrect.

Never-

theless, plaintiff's position again ignores the express statutory
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 which permits a landowner,
such as defendant in the present case, to acquire title by adverse
possession when the landowner's claim is founded "upon a written
instrument."
claim.

That is the theory on which defendant founds her

Principles applicable to a prescriptive easement have no

place when a statutory adverse possession claim is asserted based
on a deed.
Thus, defendant was properly entitled to base her claim of
adverse possession on statutory adverse use for the statutory
seven-year period.

The trial court erred in applying the common

law 20-year period for a prescriptive easement to defendant's claim
of adverse possession.
C.

That ruling must be reversed.

Defendant Has Satisfied All Requirements To Show
Adverse Possession Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-8,
Et Seq.

Although plaintiff attempts to show that defendant did not
"use" her property "exclusive of other right" for the required
period, that is not what the statute requires defendant to show.
Section 78-12-8 states "[w]henever it appears that the occupant
. . . entered into possession of the property under claim of title,
exclusive of other right"--not exclusive of other use. The undisputed fact is that none of the deeds in the chain of title to

plaintiff's and defendant's properties show any reference to plaintiff's claimed easement.

(R 220, 1 29.)

Thus, defendant entered

into her property "exclusive of other right" within the meaning of
Section 78-12-8.
In any event, defendant's predecessor, Mr. Norton, confronted
a Mrs. Mower who sought to cross Defendant's Property in 1982 and
refused to allow the crossing unless a court order was obtained.
Plaintiff admitted this fact.

(Brief of Appellee, at 4.)

In light

of plaintiff's further admission that the "prescriptive clock"
began to run at the time Mr. Norton refused to permit Mrs. Mower
to cross Defendant's Property in 1982 (R 143), there can be no
disagreement that defendant's and her predecessor's claim under
Section 78-12-8 was "exclusive of other right" at least from that
point on. Because plaintiff did not file his complaint until 1997
(R 1-4), the seven-year statutory period for adverse possession
therefore ran by the end of 1989, and plaintiff's claimed easement
was extinguished.
In addition, even if it is assumed that Section 78-12-8 requires defendant to show "exclusive use" of her property for seven
years, defendant has satisfied that requirement.

Plaintiff, as

stated, acknowledged the undisputed fact that "[s]ometime in 1982,
members of Appellee's family sought to cross the Appellant's
property to access Appellees' property, but were confronted by the
owner at that time, Mr. Norton, who refused to allow the crossing
unless a court order was obtained."

(Brief of Appellee, at 4.)

Because plaintiff further acknowledged before the trial court that
this incident was "sufficiently adverse" to start the running of
the period for adverse possession, as stated above, the seven-year
period for defendant's adverse possession of the claimed easementby-necessity ran at least by the end of 1989.
The question to be addressed by this Court is whether plaintiff presented any facts to dispute the fact that the "use" by
defendant's predecessor during that seven-year period was "exclusive of other right."

Plaintiff attempts to show such "use" was

not exclusive by stating that plaintiff presented facts to show he
"used the easement on numerous occasions, some within seven years
prior to this lawsuit being filed in July of 1997."
Appellee, at 15.)

(Brief of

The fact, even if it is a fact, that plaintiff

used the claimed easement from 1990 to 1997, does not refute defendant's argument that defendant's and her predecessor's adverse
possession was completed between 1982 and 1989.

In addition,

plaintiff's own citations to the record (R 231 ^

1 & 3) do not

present facts showing that plaintiff used the claimed easement from
1982 to 1989.5

5

(See Brief of Appellee, at 3 & 15.)

Also, it is

Plaintiff states only that he used the easement, but other
than from 1990 to 1997, he does not state when.
(Brief of Appellee, at 3 Sc 15.) Also, use by plaintiff to defeat adverse
possession could only follow his acquisition of his property (the
dominant estate) after he purchased his property in 1986, not when
he was a boy. He has not shown that he had any right to the property before 1986, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 refers to a claim
of right by the owner of the property, "exclusive of other right,"
for purposes of adverse possession. Plaintiff has not shown he had
any such "right" when he was a boy.

undisputed that Mr. Norton put a lock on the portion of the fence
that could be opened, and this was done to keep anyone from pulling
back the fence to cross Defendant's Property.

(R 213, 1 4.) Thus,

no disputed issue of material fact exists with respect to the exclusivity of defendant's use during the seven-year period from 1982
through 1989, which is the statutory period claimed by defendant
in this case.6
Alternatively, to the extent it is determined that plaintiff,
under his theory of "exclusive use," presented any facts to show
that he used the claimed easement within the adverse possession
period, then disputed issues of material fact exist as to whether
defendant's and her predecessors' "use" was exclusive during that
period. Defendant's affidavits presented to the Court showed that
no one used the claimed easement from the mid-1960s until 1992.
(R 216-18, M

12-15 & 18-19; 215, U 10.)

The Nortons maintained

a fence along the south side of the county road and never permitted anyone to use any portion of defendant's property as an
easement or otherwise during that time.

(R 216, 1 13.)

In addi-

tion, Mr. Norton put a lock on the fence in 1982 to keep anyone
from pulling the fence back and to ensure that no one would cross
the east end of defendant's property to get to the old house on
6

It is significant that the Court in Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887
P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1994), a case cited by plaintiff, recognized that
"the period of adverse possession began in 1990 when Coffee and
Hoblyn demanded the easement be opened and Mueller refused." Id.
at 509. Thus, under Mueller, an additional reason exists why the
seven-year statutory period in the present case would have run by
the end of 1989.

plaintiff's property.

(R 213, 1 4.)

Plaintiff, therefore, could

not have used the easement from 1982 until defendant purchased her
property in 1992.

Defendant also installed a metal gate with a

lock shortly after she purchased the property so that only she and
her family could access the property at the point plaintiff claims
the easement started to run across Defendant's Property.
19, H 24.)

(R 218-

In addition, Cleon Rigby, a long-time resident of the

area, never saw anyone pull back the fence along the county road
or gain access through the fence to plaintiff's property.
11 10.)

(R 215,

Therefore, the trial court, at the very least, committed

error in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the
adverse possession issue.

Disputed issues of material fact exist

in this case, at the very least, which preclude the granting of
summary judgment.
Plaintiff next maintains that defendant's undisputed facts
do not show that her use of the property was hostile and adverse.
(Appellee's Brief, at 15-16.)

Plaintiff bases his argument on

cases from other jurisdictions that have nothing to do with the
requirements of Utah's adverse possession statute.7 Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-9, entitled "What constitutes adverse possession under
written instrument," provides:
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession

7

Plaintiff again cites Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500 (Wyo.
1994), and also Colouch v. Kramer, 813 P.2d 876 (Idaho 1991), in
support of his argument. Neither involved statutory requirements
like those in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, et seq.

by any person claiming a title founded upon a written
instrument or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to
have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:
(1)
proved .

Where it has been usually cultivated or im-

(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial
inclosure.
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used
for . . . the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or
for the ordinary use of the occupant.

The facts presented by defendant indisputably satisfy the above
statutory
brief.

requirements, as demonstrated
(Appellant's Brief, at 15-18.)

addressed these points.

in defendant's

initial

Plaintiff has not even

(See Brief of Appellees, at 15-17.)

Thus,

the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of adverse possession.8
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
EXIST CONCERNING WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED EASEMENT WAS
ABANDONED.
In defendant's opening brief, defendant cited Utah law which

recognizes that "an easement or right-of-way may be abandoned."
(Brief of Appellant, at 19.)

Plaintiff does not challenge defen-

dant's statements of the law.

Instead, he attempts to distinguish

the cases cited by defendant, primarily on the basis that those
cases deal with express easements.
8

(Brief of Appellee, at 23-26.)

It should also be noted, as shown by defendant's initial
brief, that the facts presented by defendant show adverse use of a
substantial nature. (Brief of Appellant, at 15-18.)

Plaintiff, however, fails to show that the general principles of
law adopted by the courts in those cases have no application to
claims of abandonment of easements-by-necessity.
That such principles apply equally to cases involving abandonment of easements-by-necessity is shown by Pencader Assoc. , Inc.
v. Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097 (Dela. 1982), cited by defendant
in her opening brief.

(Brief of Appellant, at 19.)

In Pencader,

the court recognized the equitable defenses of adverse possession
and abandonment, both of which can be invoked to extinguish a
claimed easement-by-necessity. Id. at 1100. To establish abandonment, the owner of the servient estate must show clear intent to
abandon, "expressed or through acts of relinquishment, to abandon."
See id.
Although plaintiff attempts to distinguish the cases cited by
defendant on their facts, it is significant that plaintiff does not
take issue with defendant's position that "courts have found that
evidence of an easement holder's non-use of an easement and acquiescence to the servient property owner's obstruction of an easement
for a long period of time will justify a finding of abandonment."
(See Brief of Appellee, at 23-26.)

That is the principle invoked

by defendant in support of her position on appeal that the trial
court erred in light of the facts showing not only non-use, but
also acquiescence by plaintiff and his predecessors to the obstruction of the claimed easement by defendant and her predecessors for
over 3 0 years.

Such acquiescence constitutes evidence of actual

intent to abandon within the meaning of the law of abandonment, as
shown by the cases cited by defendant.

(See Brief of Appellant,

at 20-21.)
Sindler v. William M. Bailev Co., 204 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1965),
for example, demonstrates that acts similar to those in the present
case may be used to show "an intention never again to make use of
the easement

in question."

See id. at 719-20.

The facts upon
(a) dis-

which an intent to abandon in Sindler were based include

appearance of wooden planks that formed a bridge across a brook,
(b) subsequent

widening

of

the brook and erosion of

(c) respondent's and its predecessor's

its banks,

standing by for 35 years

while the disputed area was confined to the use of the owners of
the parcel upon which the easement was located, and

(d) acquies-

cence by the respondent in the construction of a chainlink fence
which enclosed the disputed area for several years and the subsequent placing of a chain across the entrance to the disputed area
to prevent

its use by persons

other than

those working

factory on the premises of the servient estate.
Also,

plaintiff

overlooks

key

facts

upon

in

the

Id. at 719-20.
which

the

court

in Albanese v. Dominianni, 281 A.D. 768, 118 N.Y.S.2d

347

(N.Y.

App. Div. 1953), based its decision of abandonment.

One of those

important facts was "plaintiff's acquiescence in defendants' construction and maintenance of a curbing, metal fence, and garden
on defendants' property."
larly

constructed

curbing,

Id. at 768.
a wooden

Although plaintiffs simi-

fence, and a garden

within

the easement area for more than 2 0 years, Albanese stands for the
principle upon which defendant relies in the present case to show
abandonment--acquiescence by the owner of the dominant estate in
the obstruction of a claimed easement by the owner of the servient
estate for a long period of time.

Non-use coupled with failure

to object or "omission evincing a clear intent to abandon, or
2) adverse possession by the servient estate" may result in abandonment of the claimed easement.

See Canadian Nat. Ry. v. Sprague,

609 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Me. 1992).
Finally, although plaintiff contends that the facts cited by
defendant in her opening brief merely show non-use of plaintiff's
claimed easement-by-necessity for many years, plaintiff fails again
to address defendant's full position.

Those same facts, as stated

by defendant in her opening brief, show omissions and acquiescence
from the late 1930s or early 1940s which are plainly inconsistent
with any intention on the part of plaintiff and his predecessors
to make further use of their property or the easement.
of Appellant, at 21-24.)

(See Brief

By way of summary, the facts show the

following:
(a)

When

the

occupants

of plaintiff's

property

moved from the property in the late 1930s or early 1940s, they
left the home to deteriorate to the point that animals began
to inhabit the home.
(b)

From the late 1930s or early 1940s, no one

lived in the old home and no one used plaintiff's property or

the easement claimed by plaintiff, nor did anyone maintain
the house or property until a member of plaintiff's family
attempted to cut across a portion of defendant's property
and was confronted by Mr. Norton in 1982.
(c)

From at least the mid-1960s until the present

time, the claimed easement was fenced off and subsequently
blocked by a locked gate.

Neither defendant nor her prede-

cessors ever let anyone use that portion of their property
for access to the old house or for any other purpose.
(d)

A huge rock pile exists on the south side of

the dilapidated house on plaintiff's property and makes that
portion of the property unusable.
(e)

When the Nortons purchased defendant' s property

in the mid-1960s, it was obvious that plaintiff's property
had long since been abandoned.

There was no evidence at that

time of an easement or lane across the eastern portion of
defendant's property to the old house.
(f)

Even

plaintiff

acknowledged

that

the

old,

dilapidated house on his property had been "abandoned."
(Brief of Appellant, at 21-24.)
Also, as demonstrated, plaintiff and his predecessors stood
by for over 30 years, from at least the mid-1960s until plaintiff
filed the present action, and acquiesced in defendant's and her
predecessors' blocking of the claimed easement by constructing a
fence, placing "No Trespassing" signs on the fence, later placing

a lock on the fence, plowing and planting grass within the claimed
easement area, and grazing animals within that area.
lant's Brief, at 23.)

(See Appel-

Plaintiff has not addressed these key and

most significant facts.9
In short, the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment that the easement was not abandoned.
issues of material fact exist regarding abandonment.

Disputed

Defendant's

facts show not only non-use of the claimed easement since the late
1930s or early 1940s, but conduct by plaintiff and his predecessors
that is plainly inconsistent with any intention to make further use
of the property for nearly half a century.

Plaintiff and his pre-

decessors acquiesced in defendant's and her predecessors' obstruction of the easement for over 30 years.

Even when Mr. Norton con-

fronted a Mrs. Mower and told her that she had no right to trespass
on defendant's property, she did not claim that she had an easement

9

Also, instead of showing that no disputed issues of material
fact exist, plaintiff attempts to argue or present a different version of certain facts. Examples include the following:
(a) Plaintiff acknowledges that the house had been abandoned,
"but argues that defendant assumes that if the house is abandoned,
the property must also be abandoned. ..." (See Brief of Appellee,
at 21.)
(b) Plaintiff has testified that he used the property for
hunting, recreation and pasturing his animals.
(Id.)
This is
contrary to defendant's facts and, even then, does not state when
such activities allegedly occurred. (See R 217-19, HH 15, 23 and
25; R 216, % 13; R 215, 1 10.)
(c) Plaintiff acknowledges the existence of the huge rock
pile, but states, "[h]ow is this clear and unequivocal evidence of
Appellee's intent to abandon the easement?
Is it possible that
Appellee simply does not want to incur the cost of removing the
rock pile?"
(Brief of Appellee, at 22.)

across the eastern portion of defendant's property.

Accordingly,

the district court's summary judgment must be reversed and the
case remanded for trial on the issue of abandonment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated abov^e, the trial court's summary
judgment against defendant should be reversed in its entirety and
summary judgment should be entered in defendant's favor, establishing that plaintiff's claimed easement was extinguished by adverse
possession. In the alternative, the Court should reverse the judgment against defendant and order that defendant's claims of adverse
possession and abandonment be tried.
Respectfully submitted this 2.5

day of August, 2002.
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